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Abstract. The article compares Roland Barthes’s and Juri Lotman’s notions of 
‘second-order semiological systems’ [systemes sémiologique seconds] and ‘secondary 
modelling systems’ [вторичные моделирующие системы]. It investigates the shared 
presuppositions of the two theories and their important divergences from each other, 
explaining them in terms of the opposite strategic roles that the notions of ‘ideology’ 
and ‘culture’ play in the work of Barthes and Lotman, respectively. The immersion 
of secondary modelling systems in culture as a “system of systems” characterized by 
internal heterogeneity, allows Lotman to evidence their positive creative potential: 
the result of the tensions arising from cultural systemic plurality and heterogeneity 
may coincide with the emergence of new, unpredictable meanings in translation. The 
context of Barthes’s second-order semiological systems is instead provided by highly 
homogeneous ideological frames that appropriate the signs of the first-order system 
and make them into forms for significations which confirm, reproduce and transmit 
previously existing information generated by hegemonic social and cultural discourses. 
The article shows how these differences resurface and, partially, fade away in the theories 
of the text that Barthes and Lotman elaborated in the 1970s. The discussion is concluded 
by some remarks on the possible topicality of Barthes’s and Lotman’s approaches for 
contemporary semiotics and the humanities in general. 
Keywords: Barthes; Lotman; second-order semiological systems; secondary modelling 
systems; culture; ideology; text
From time to time the history of ideas offers surprising examples of synchronization 
in the thematic focus and research development of thinkers between whom there is no 
direct contact. For some this represents clear evidence of a Zeitgeist, while for others 
it is simply a matter of coincidence. Roland Barthes’s and Juri Lotman’s work from 
the 1960s on the foundations of semiotics represents a particularly intriguing case 
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of intellectual synchronization. Although some of Lotman’s texts started to circulate 
in French translation in the journal Tel Quel as early as 1968, the Parisian thinker 
never refers in his work to the Tartu scholar. Considering that Julia Kristeva, the other 
leading figure of French semiology at that time, was, in contrast, deeply interested in 
Lotman’s ideas and actively advocated and mediated them to the Parisian intellectual 
circles,1 Barthes’s silence may even be interpreted as an explicit lack of interest or as 
an index of the distance between the two theoreticians. A shift of attention from Paris 
to Tartu seems to confirm the reciprocity of this attitude: Lotman rarely mentions 
Barthes in his research work and the judgement he expresses on the French semiotician 
in a couple of private letters is far from favourable. However, in an overview of the 
international development of semiotics written in 1968, Lotman describes Barthes’s 
seminal analyses of mode and mass culture (Mythologies) as a “very interesting” 
application of the structuralist method to the study of everyday life in France. He 
gives more general praise to French semioticians for they share the Soviet scholars’ 
attention to the theoretical and methodological foundations of the discipline vis-à-vis 
the empirical orientation of the American semiotics at the time.2 Yet Lotman (1968: 
582–584) also detects a certain carelessness and superficiality in the application of 
semiotic methods to literary analysis by French scholars. What we cannot find either 
in this overview nor anywhere else in Lotman’s work is a real theoretical engagement 
with the new conceptual tools that Barthes bestowed to the rising science of semiotics.
All this appears particularly puzzling when we consider the striking similarities 
in some of the concepts that come to occupy a central position in the attempts by 
Lotman – and more generally the Tartu-Moscow School – and Barthes to lay down 
the bases of semiology/semiotics as the new general science of sign systems prefigured 
by Ferdinand de Saussure. First of all, pursuing the task proposed by Saussure yet left 
unachieved in his work, Barthes and Lotman focus their attention on the relations 
between natural language and other sign systems. Secondly, and most importantly, 
the study of these relations brings them to a similar general typology of sign systems 
that distinguishes language as a “primary system” from what Barthes calls “second-
order semiological systems” [systemes sémiologique seconds] and Lotman “secondary 
modelling systems” [вторичные моделирующие системы]. This is something 
completely new and unknown to Saussure, particularly if we consider that this is not 
just one idea among others, but the central key concept in both Barthes’s semiology 
and Lotman’s semiotics. In Elements of Semiology (1964) Barthes thus describes 
semiology as that part of linguistics which takes as an object the “great signifying 
1 See e.g. Kristeva 1969. Kristeva has recently been criticized for her tendentious mis-
understanding of Lotman’s ideas (Landolt 2012). Th is certainly did not hinder the reception of 
Lotman in France, but rather facilitated it. 
2 In his overview Lotman praises for instance Barthes’ Elements of Semiotics. 
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units of discourse”, “a second-order language”, whose units are no longer monemes 
or phonemes, but “larger fragments of discourse referring to objects and episodes 
whose meaning underlies language, but can never exist independently of it” (Barthes 
2010[1964]: 11).3 As for the “secondary modelling systems” of the Tartu-Moscow 
school, it has even been claimed that they were nothing other than a synonym tout 
court for semiotics, which was considered a suspicious notion in the Soviet Union in 
the 1960s (Uspenskij 1995: 106–107). Thus, in the same year that Barthes published 
his Elements of Semiology, the first Summer School on Secondary Modelling Systems 
(not ‘Semiotics’) took place in the small Southern-Estonian village of Kääriku.
Last, but not least, Barthes and Lotman also share the extension of the notion of 
‘language’ to include not only the primary, but also the secondary systems. Barthes 
(1991: 109) refers to this extension in Mythologies as “a generic way of conceiving 
language” that he defines as “any significant unit or synthesis, whether verbal or 
visual”.4 While in the classic structuralist approach this constitutes the premise for 
the consequent extension of the (Saussurean) linguistic method from the study of 
natural languages to the study of all other sign systems/languages, Tartu-Moscow 
scholars stress already in 1965, in their first collective volume, the possible limits that 
a method elaborated exclusively on the basis of evidence from natural languages may 
encounter in the attempt to explain secondary systems whose specificity has not yet 
been investigated, but needs to be: 
[...]  one of the fundamental issues in the investigation of secondary modelling 
systems is the determination of their relationship with linguistic structures. This is 
why it is important to explain what we mean by the notion of ‘linguistic structure’. 
It is undisputable that every sign system (secondary systems included) can be 
considered as a language. [...] A consequence of this is the conviction that any 
system of signs can be, in principle, investigated with linguistic methods, and the 
special role of contemporary linguistics as a methodological discipline. However, 
from “linguistic methods” in this broad sense, we must distinguish those scientific 
principles which come from the habit of dealing with natural languages – which 
are a particular kind of linguistic system. It appears that it is taking this path 
that makes the search for the peculiarity [своеобразие]  of secondary modelling 
systems and the means of studying them [способы их изучения] possible. (Lotman 
1965: 6; my translation, D. M.)5
3  Barthes thus coins the term ‘trans-linguistics’ (where the prefi x ‘trans-’ denotes the passage 
to the second-order) as a synonym of ‘semiology’.
4   Barthes stresses in this respect that semiology will treat words and images in the same way, 
that is, as signs (Barthes 1957: 188).
5 “[…] одним из основных вопросов изучения вторичных моделирующих систем 
является определение их отношения к языковым структурам. При этом необходимо 
оговорить содержание, которое мы вкладываем в понятие «языковая структура». 
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This represents an important deviation (shared, even if not so explicitly, by Barthes) 
from Saussure’s project for a science of semiology. While Saussure (2000: 17) stressed 
that “[i]f one wishes to discover the true nature of language systems, one must first 
consider what they have in common with all other systems of the same kind”, Lotman 
(and Barthes) are rather interested in determining how some of these “other systems”, 
or “secondary systems” differ from natural language as the primary system.
Summing up these introductory remarks, we can say that Barthes’s and Lotman’s 
theories share: (1) a division of semiotic systems into primary and secondary ones; (2) 
the understanding of secondary systems as “languages” of a specific kind; and (3) the 
centrality of the notion of the secondary system and its study for the advancement of 
the new science of semiology/semiotics. 
However, the two thinkers importantly diverge in the way they come to understand 
the “peculiarity” of secondary systems in relation to primary ones and, consequently, 
the “means of their study”. In what follows I will compare Barthes’s and Lotman’s 
understanding of secondary systems, investigating the most important divergences 
in the two theories and explaining them in terms of the opposite strategic roles that 
the notions of ‘ideology’ and of ‘culture’ play in the work of Barthes and Lotman 
respectively. Further I will show how these differences resurface and, partially, 
fade away in their theories of the text. This discussion will allow me to draw some 
conclusions on the relevance of Barthes’s and Lotman’s approaches for contemporary 
semiotics and, possibly, the humanities in general. 
First- and second-order semiological systems: Barthes       
The concept of the ‘second-order semiological system’ was first introduced by Barthes 
in Mythologies (1957), where it occupies the most fundamental position in the 
definition of the myth, which constitutes the topic of the entire book. Though the myth 
shares with any other semiological system the Saussurean “tri-dimensional scheme” of 
the signifier, the signified and the sign, the latter being no more than the correlation 
which unites the first two, the specificity of the myth lies for Barthes (1991[1957]: 113) 
precisely in its “secondness”:
Бесспорно, что всякая знаковая система (в том числе и вторичная) может рассматри-
ваться как особого рода язык. […] Отсюда вытекает убеждение, что любая знаковая 
система в принципе может изучаться лингвистическими методами, а также особая 
роль современного языкознания как методологической дисциплины. Однако от 
«лингвистических методов» в этом, широком, смысле следует отличать те научные 
принципы, которые подсказаны привычкой оперировать естественными языками – 
особой, частной разновидностью, языковых систем. Видимо, на этом пути возможны 
поиски своеобразия вторичных моделирующих систем и способов их изучения.” 
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In myth, we find again the tri-dimensional pattern which I have just described: 
the signifier, the signified and the sign. But myth is a peculiar system, in that it is 
constructed from a semiological chain which existed before it: it is a second-order 
semiological system. That which is a sign (namely the associative total of a concept 
and an image) in the first system, becomes a mere signifier in the second.
The metaphorical spatialization of the relations between the first and second 
semiological systems presented by Barthes in the famous scheme reproduced here 
in Figure 1 evidences the first paradoxical issue: although the second-order system 
is semiologically “construed” [s’édifie] upon the primary system that it presupposes, 
from an ideological point of view the secondary system subjugates, as we will see, 
the primary one, replacing it as the surreptitious starting point (natural basis) of the 





1. signifier 2.  signified 
                        3. sign 
                I. SIGNIFIER 
 
          II. SIGNIFIED 
                                                    III. SIGN
Figure 1. The semiological scheme of myth in Barthes’s Mythologies.
Before investigating this crucial aspect of Barthes’s theory, we must consider the 
development of the notion of the second-order semiological system in Elements 
of Semiology where it occupies the central position in the definition of the notion 
of connotation. Connotation is indeed the means by which Barthes translates the 
definition of myth quoted above into the more general and abstract terms of his new 
theory of semiology: 
 […] connotation, that is, the development of a system of second-order meanings, 
which are so to speak parasitic on the language proper. This second-order system 
is also a “language”. (Barthes 2010[1964]: 30)6
6 Th ere are some important diff erences between the theory of myth and that of connotation, 
which have to do with Barthes’s understanding of metalanguage. Whereas in Mythologies 
he describes the relation between the primary language and myth as also being a relation 
between an object-language and a meta-language (Barthes 1957: 188), in Elements of 
Semiology he distinguishes between two diff erent ways of deriving the second system from 
the fi rst: connotation and metalanguage (Barthes 2010[1964]: 89–94). In so far as the issue of 
metalanguage is not relevant for my argument, I will not pursue this line of analysis in what 
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The parasitic relationship used here to characterize the development of the second-
order system from the first is a good illustration of the paradox mentioned above: the 
parasite needs its host, but may end up suffocating it. If we take a look at Barthes’s 
metaphorical spatialization of connotation (see Figure 2), it is interesting to observe 
that the scheme reproduces the one suggested for myth (see Figure 1)7, but reverses 
the positions of the first-order and the second-order systems, bringing to the fore 
the idea of “construction upon” and “development from” and, at the same time, the 
hierarchical relation between the two systems – what is above comes to occupy the 
most preeminent position by covering and hiding what lies underneath it.8  
  
          connotation                   (myth)  
 
          denotation (langue) 
          signifier 
 




Figure 2. The semiological scheme of connotation in Barthes’s Elements.
This is of paramount importance in understanding the peculiarity of second-order 
semiological systems and their difference from (natural) language in Barthes. 
The passage to the ‘second-order’ provokes a decrease in the differential and 
arbitrary nature of the ‘first-order’ linguistic sign, as defined by Saussure. In Elements, 
Barthes (2010[1964]: 73) pays particular attention to the first aspect as he comments: 
follows, focusing the attention rather on the common elements of myth and connotation as 
second-order semiological systems.   
7 Th e disappearance of the third term (the sign) of the “tri-dimensional pattern” from 
the scheme of connotation only appears to occur. In fact, Barthes introduces the chapter on 
connotation of Elements of Semiology with a new reference to the tri-dimensionality of any 
system of signifi cation that he represents there as the E (expression = signifi er) R (relation 
between the plan of expression and the plan of content = the ‘sign’) and C (content = signifi ed) 
scheme. Before presenting the scheme reproduced in Figure 2, he consistently illustrates 
connotation as:
2       E          R      C      (connotation)
1     ERC         (denotation) 
8 Th e canonical English translation ‘second-order semiological system’ for the French 
systemes sémiologique seconds contributes to increase this hierarchical reading. Th e similarity 
with Marxist ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’ is not just a coincidence, given the central place of 
ideology in Barthes’s understanding of second-order systems.  
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The absolutely differential value of the language is therefore probable only if we 
mean the articulated language; in the secondary systems […] the language is 
‘impure’, so to speak: it does contain a differential element (that is, pure ‘language’) 
[…] but also something positive.
In Mythologies, it is the arbitrariness of the sign that is brought into question by the 
second-order system of the myth:
We know that in language the sign is arbitrary: nothing compels the acoustic image 
tree ‘naturally’ to mean the concept tree: the sign, here, is unmotivated. […] The 
mythical signification, on the other hand, is never arbitrary; it is always in part 
motivated, and unavoidably contains some analogy. (Barthes 1991[1957]: 124)
The decrease in the differentiality and the arbitrariness of the sign is thus a direct 
consequence of secondariness: while first-order signs institute the otherwise inexistent 
and consequently arbitrary relation between the signifier and the signified, second-
order signs on the contrary rest on an already existing whole – connotation rests on 
denotation, myth on langue. Different elements of the first-order system thus become a 
single element for the second-order system. Let us consider, for instance, Barthes’s well 
known analysis of the cover of Paris Match where a “young Negro” in a military uniform 
presumably salutes, “with his eyes uplifted”, the French tricolour (Barthes 1991[1957]: 
115; see Figure 3).  This description of the picture in the “articulated language” can be 
considered as the sign of the first-order system which unites pictorial signifiers (different 
colours and shades on paper in a specific composition) with their signifieds (a young 
black male, a saluting hand on one side of the face, a military hat, etc.). 
Figure 3. Cover of Paris Match commented on 
by Barthes in Mythologies.
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Now this sign as a whole becomes the new signifier of the second-order system (see 
Figure 1 above), where it starts to signify Frenchness and militarism. The relation 
between the second-order signifier and signified is the mythical sign which Barthes 
names ‘signification’. Signification grows as if naturally out of the final result of the 
underlying, first-order semiological process. In the case of the Paris Match cover, the 
good assimilating impact of the French colonial Empire grows naturally out of this 
“young Negro” who salutes “just like our good French kids”. The passage from the first- 
to the second-order system of myth thus brings about a passage from the arbitrary to 
the motivated, the artificial to the natural, the value to the fact:
In the second (mythical) system, causality is artificial, false; but it creeps, so 
to speak, through the back door of Nature. This is why myth is experienced as 
innocent speech: not because its intentions are hidden – if they were hidden, they 
could not be efficacious – but because they are naturalized. 
In fact, what allows the reader to consume myth innocently is that he does 
not see it as a semiological system but as an inductive one. Where there is only an 
equivalence, he sees a kind of causal process: the signifier and the signified have, 
in his eyes, a natural relationship. This confusion can be expressed otherwise: 
any semiological system is a system of value; now the myth-consumer takes the 
signification for a system of facts. (Barthes 1991[1957]: 130)
Barthes (1991[1957]: 128) describes all this as a passage from semiology to ideology 
to which he refers also in Elements, where he defines the “signified of connotation” 
as a “fragment of ideology” (Barthes 2010[1964]: 91). The second-order semiological 
system of myth and connotation functions therefore as a superstructure which, 
grounded as it is in its base-structure (the first-order system of langue and denotation), 
nevertheless results in an ideological distortion of the latter achieved through 
naturalization of second-order mythical and connotational signifieds. We can see 
this with particular clarity by juxtaposing the two schemes of myth (Figure 1) and 
connotation (Figure 2): the second-order system lies on the primary system as a 
construction occupying a higher hierarchical position (Figure 2) and it functions, at 
the same time, as a retrospective anchoring, through ideological naturalization, of the 
otherwise ungrounded and possibly drifting signs of the primary system (Figure 1).     
Primary and secondary modelling systems: Lotman
Turning now to Lotman’s and the Tartu-Moscow semioticians’ understanding of 
“secondary modelling systems”, it is interesting to observe that references to “ideology” 
are also present in their definitions, although they do not have the central function 
we have just observed in the case of Barthes. Let us take, for instance, possibly the 
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first definition of a secondary system launched by Lotman in the article “The issue 
of meaning in secondary modelling systems” (1965), later republished as a chapter of 
The Structure of the Artistic Text:
A secondary modelling system is a structure based on a natural language. Later 
the system takes on an additional secondary structure which may be ideological, 
ethical, artistic, etc. Meanings in this secondary system can be formed according 
to the means inherent to natural languages or through means employed in other 
semiotic systems. (Lotman 1977[1970]: 35)
Just as clearly as Barthes, Lotman here proposes the image of a superstructure built 
upon the base of natural language. He also considers ideology as one of the possible 
secondary structures, but does not exclusively concentrate on it. The typology of 
secondary structures apparently remains open for him (“etc.”) and, in addition to 
ideology, he explicitly mentions ethics and art – the latter of which will, as we know, 
occupy a preeminent position in Lotman’s later works.9 Lotman and the Tartu-Moscow 
semioticians do not offer in their works a graphic illustration of the relationship 
between primary and secondary systems that would make explicit the modalities of the 
construction of second-order meanings on the basis of first-order ones. However, these 
relationships and modalities are described in Theses on the Semiotic Study of Cultures, the 
seminal collective work on the semiotics of culture first published in 1973:
Under secondary modelling systems we understand such semiotic systems, with 
the aid of which models of the world or its fragments are constructed. These 
systems are secondary in relation to the primary system of natural language, over 
which they are built – directly (the supralinguistic system of literature) or in the 
shape parallel to it (music, painting). (Lotman et al. 2013[1973]: 72)10
This definition contains important notions which help to clarify both the similarity 
and the differences between the peculiar characteristics of Barthes’s second-order 
semiological systems and Lotman’s secondary modelling systems. First of all comes 
the notion of the ‘model’, which occupies a central position in the Tartu-Moscow 
semiotics of the 1960s and 1970s. Taken as constructions arising from the secondary 
system, in Lotman’s theory models also introduce a fundamentally distinctive feature 
9 From this point of view, it is interesting to observe that the notion of a ‘secondary modelling 
system’ in the title of the 1965 article is replaced in the title of the equivalent chapter of the 1970 
book with the notion of ‘artistic text’: “Th e problem of meaning in an artistic text”.  
10 Talking about the “parallelism” of systems, Lotman means the coexistence and juxtaposition 
of the diff erent languages of cultures which, on the one hand, model one and the same reality in 
diff erent ways and, on the other, enter in complex intersemiotic interaction with one another. 
I will return to this later.    
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of Barthes’s second-order semiological systems: the causality and motivation of the 
relations between the signifier and the signified in myth and connotation. Lotman 
makes a similar point about models: 
Therefore, if the relation of language with its denotation is historical-conventional 
in natural languages, the relation of the model with its object is determined by the 
structure of the modelling system. In this respect only one kind of signs – iconic 
signs – can be identified with a model. (Lotman 1967: 131; my translation, D. M.)11 
In The Structure of the Artistic Text, Lotman writes in this respect of an ‘archimeaning’, 
which emerges in those secondary systems that aspire to a “monopolistic grasp on 
worldview” and universal validity. Like Barthes’s mythical ‘signification’, Lotman’s 
‘archimeaning’ transforms a bundle of elements of the primary system into a single 
element of the secondary one. As Lotman (1977: 47) also writes,
[t]he equivalence of nonequivalent elements forces us to assume that signs which 
have different denotata on the linguistic level have a common denotatum on the 
level of a secondary system. […] A secondary modelling system of the artistic type 
constructs its own system of denotata, one which is not a copy, but a model of the 
world of denotata with their general linguistic meaning.
In Theses on the Semiotic Study of Culture, the Tartu-Moscow semioticians consequently 
claim that phenomena revealed in secondary modelling systems point to a decrease in 
semiotic complexity and an increase in simplicity (Lotman et al. 2013: 69) that seems, 
once again, to match the decrease in differentiality and arbitrariness (the passage from 
semiology to ideology) brought about by connotation and myth according to Barthes.
Despite these convergences, it would be incorrect to push Lotman further in the 
direction of Barthes. In fact, in the passages from the Theses quoted above, the Tartu-
Moscow semioticians already distinguish between two different modalities of the 
relations between the primary and secondary systems. The first is clearly hierarchical 
in nature, involving the articulation of a base and a superstructure. For instance, their 
description of the relations between ‘the primary system of natural language’ and the 
‘supralinguistic system of literature’ almost coincides with Barthes’s illustration of the 
relations between first-order and second-order semiological systems in Elements:
11 “Поэтому, если отношение языка к денотату в естественном языке исторически-
конвенционально, то отношение модели к объекту определено структурой модели-
рующей системы. В этом смысле только один тип знаков – и к о н и ч е с к и е  з н а к и  – 
может быть приравнен моделям.” From this point of view it is interesting to observe that 
Barthes’s Saussurean terminology similarly brings him to affi  rm the iconicity of mythical 
signifi cation: “But for the myth-reader […] everything happens as if the picture naturally 
conjured up the concept, as if the signifi er gave a foundation to the signifi ed” (Barthes 1991: 129).
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a connoted system is a system whose plane of expression is itself constituted by a 
signifying system: the common case of connotation will consist of complex systems 
of which language forms the first system (this is, for instance, the case with 
literature). (Barthes 2010[1964]: 90)
The second modality of the relation between the primary and secondary modelling 
systems mentioned in the Theses’ passage, i.e. the parallelism of the systems involved, 
their being side by side instead of one above the other, never occurs in Barthes’s 
description of myth and connotation by contrast. This is an important issue, because 
it allows us to introduce a fundamental principle of the semiotics of culture, which 
also constitutes the main reason for the divergence between Barthes’s and Lotman’s 
understandings of secondary systems. I am thinking here of the impossibility for any 
system, be it primary or secondary, of being thought of in isolation; any attempt to 
do so brings about an idealized (and, therefore, ideological) description of the given 
system. Semiotic reality always implies, on the contrary, a plurality of at least two 
juxtaposed systems which interact and intersect, entering into a complex relation of 
dialogue and conflict (Lotman 1997: 10; 2009: 4–6).12
Culture vs. ideology 
It is at this point that the notion of culture comes to occupy its strategic place for the 
understanding of secondary modelling systems in Lotman’s works. This emerges with 
particular clarity in a definition to be found in Lotman’s book Analysis of the Poetic 
Text, originally published in 1972:
Secondary modelling systems: semiotic systems constructed on the basis of a 
natural language but having a more complex structure. Secondary modelling 
systems include ritual, all aggregates of social and ideological sign communications, 
and art, all of which merge into a single complex semiotic whole – a culture. 
(Lotman 1976[1972]: 19)13
The relation between the primary and the secondary systems, and the relation between 
secondary systems and culture as a whole is presented here in terms of a progressive 
12  For a discussion of these aspects of Lotman’s semiotics of culture see Monticelli 2012, 2008: 
185–210.
13 “Вторичные моделирующие системы  – семиотические системы, построенные на 
основе естественного языка, но имеющие более сложную структуру. Вторичные моде-
лирующие системы, ритуал, все совокупности социальных и идеологических знаковых 
коммуникаций, искусство складываются в единое сложное семиотическое целое  – 
культуру” (Lotman 1972: 21).
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increase in structural complexity, quite the opposite of what was stated above on the basis 
of an incidental remark in the Theses. From this point of view, the word ‘homogeneous’ 
may be misleading when employed by Lotman in the passage quoted above to describe 
culture as a “complex semiotic whole” or, as elsewhere (e.g. Lotman et al 2013: 71), a 
“system of systems”. In his works, Lotman rather and repeatedly stresses the heterogeneity 
of culture: internal polyglotism is its essential and vital property,14 and this means that 
cultural dynamics is always crossed by an irreducible tension between homogenizing and 
differentiating forces, as first described by the Tartu-Moscow semioticians in the Theses 
(Lotman et al. 2013: 76–77). Lotman often defines this tension in terms of a translation 
between incommensurable systems or languages, which is a paradoxical translation in 
a situation of untranslatability where the movement across the boundaries of differently 
structured subsystems represents a fundamental prerequisite of cultural dynamism. As 
Lotman (1974: 226; my translation, D. M.)15 explains:
[…] disharmony between these subsystems is a source of pathological phenomena 
if we consider culture from a syncrhonic point of view, while diacrhonically it 
works as a source of dynamism for the system as a whole. 
In this respect it is interesting to observe that if secondary modelling systems were 
the fundamental object of study for the Tartu-Moscow semioticians, the development 
of the semiotics of culture clearly brought about a shift of attention from the 
(structuralist) investigation of isolated sign systems to the interaction between different 
systems. It is in this respect interesting to read the new definition of the ‘semiotics of 
culture’ proposed by Lotman in 1981, seventeen years after the first summer school 
on ‘secondary modelling systems’ and eight years after the Theses. According to this 
definition the semiotics of culture investigates 
[…] the mutual interaction of semiotic systems with different structures, the 
internal heterogeneity of semiotic space, the inevitability of cultural and semiotic 
polyglotism. (Lotman 1981: 3; my translation, D. M.)16
14 As Lotman and Uspenskij state for instance in the article “On the semiotic mechanism of 
culture”, originally published in 1971, “the heterogeneity of the inner organisation is a law for 
the existence of culture” (Lotman, Uspenskij 1978: 226). 
15 “дисгармония между этими подсистемами, являясь при рассмотрении культуры 
в синхронном аспекте источником болезненных явлений, в диахронном освещении 
выступает как источник динамики системы в целом”.  
16  “Оформление семиотики культуры – дисциплины, рассматривающей взаимодействие 
разноустроенных семиотических систем, внутреннюю неравномерность семиотического 
пространства, необходимость культурного и семиотического полиглотизма,  – в 
значительной мере сдвинуло традиционные семиотические представления”.
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The immersion of secondary modelling systems in a cultural whole characterized 
by internal heterogeneity allows Lotman to stress their positive creative potentiality: 
the result of the tensions arising from the plurality and heterogeneity of culture as a 
system of systems may coincide with the emergence of new, unpredictable meanings 
in translation. As Lotman was to claim in his last book Culture and Explosion (1992), 
the focus of the semiotics of culture thus shifted to the study of communication in 
situations that complicate it or render it utterly impossible, but from which valuable 
novelty might arise: “You could say that the translation of the untranslatable may 
become the carrier of information of the highest value” (Lotman 2009: 6). 
Barthes’s second-order systems do not enter such paradoxical communication 
with other structurally incommensurable systems, as their context is not provided by 
the cultural system of systems with its heterogeneity and polyglotism, but by highly 
homogeneous ideological frames. They appropriate the signs of the first-order system 
and turn them into forms for signification which confirms, reproduces and transmits 
pre-existing information generated by hegemonic social and cultural discourses. Barthes 
(1991[1957]: 131) imagines this as a potentially all-encompassing mechanism: “In fact, 
nothing can be safe from myth, myth can develop its second-order schema from any 
meaning”. This is why in Mythologies, he writes of myth as “stolen language”, defining 
semiology as critique of ideology and the sémiologue as an agent of demystification: 
he [the sémiologue] therefore seems to have the objective function of decipherer 
(his language is an operation) in relation to the world which naturalizes or 
conceals the signs of the first system under the signifiers of the second. (Barthes 
2010[1964]: 94)17
Why does Barthes’s theory of second-order systems not reserve any place for the 
Lotmanian system of systems (culture) as a possible pluralistic and polyglottal 
alternative to the homogenizing force of ideology? I think there are two reasons for 
this. First of all, when Barthes refers to culture in Mythologies, he seems to have only 
“mass culture” in mind, as he writes in the preface added to the 1970 edition of the 
book, where he identifies as a fundamental task of his work the “ideological critique 
bearing on the language of so called mass-culture” (Barthes 1991[1957]: 8).18 Lotman’s 
understanding of culture as a system of systems admits, on the contrary, a complex, 
17 Th is deciphering has, for Barthes, the nature of a social necessity in so far as society 
continually develops second-order semiological systems from natural languages and the 
future “probably belongs to a linguistics of connotation” (Barthes 2010[1964]: 90–91). Th e 
preeminence of second-order systems among the objects of semiology is therefore the 
immediate consequence of social developments.     
18 Regarding this, it has been argued that Barthes’s semiology could be considered as a 
“scientifi c way of understanding popular culture” (Strinati 2004: 97).
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multi-level interpretation which includes different cultural layers. Secondly, in 
contrast with Lotman’s notion of culture as a dynamic milieu for the generation of new 
meanings, Barthes tends to see culture as a synonym of tradition and conformism.19 
Though the word ‘culture’ is almost completely missing from Mythologies and 
Elements of Semiology, it repeatedly pops up in Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text 
where it is almost without exception employed in oppositions which involve the ‘text 
of pleasure’ [texte de plaisir] and the ‘text of bliss’ [texte de jouissance] – the first being 
characterized by moderate, controlled and predictable reading gratification, the second 
by unbounded linguistic play and drift. Culture unequivocally associates there with the 
moderation, comfort and predictability of ‘pleasure’, while it is brought into question 
by the unmanageable power of ‘bliss’. Here are just a couple of passages from Barthes’s 
book, which clearly illustrate the nature of this opposition and the understanding of 
culture which functions as its rationale:
Text of pleasure: the text that contents, fills, grants euphoria; the text that comes 
from culture and does not break with it, is linked to a comfortable practice of 
reading. Text of bliss: the text that imposes a state of loss, the text that discomforts 
[…] unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, psychological assumptions, the 
consistency of his tastes, values, memories, brings to a crisis his relation with 
language. (Barthes 1975[1973]: 14)
And later on, more synthetically, but even more incisively:
Pleasure [plaisir] of the text. Classics. Culture (the more culture, the greater, more 
diverse, the pleasure will be). Intelligence. Irony. Delicacy. Euphoria. Mastery. 
Security: art of living. […] Texts of bliss [jouissance]. Pleasure in pieces; language 
in pieces; culture in pieces […] an extreme continually shifted, an empty, mobile, 
unpredictable extreme. (Barthes 1975[1973]: 51–52) 
Considering Barthes’s terminology and rhetorical emphasis in the passages just 
quoted, it would be tempting to reread the opposition between ‘pleasure’ and ‘bliss’ 
in terms of Lotman’s conceptual pair of ‘culture’ and ‘explosion’. Yet the fundamental 
difference between the scholars nevertheless remains that, despite the title of his last 
book, for Lotman the opposite of ‘explosion’ is not ‘culture’, but ‘continuous, predictable 
processes’ (such as Barthes’s comfortable practice of reading). Culture is rather the 
general environment for the alternation and dialogical confrontation of explosions 
19 Notice that also in Lotman’s theory, culture has an important function of preservation 
and transmission of knowledge and traditions, being, as Lotman and Uspenskij claim, the 
“non-hereditary memory” of the community (Lotman, Uspensky 1978[1971]: 213). Th is 
conservative aspect of culture is, however, always counterbalanced by the heterogeneous and 
dynamic environment of the system of systems as described above.     
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and continuous processes, which are both, in this respect, cultural phenomena. 
It is interesting to observe that in The Pleasure of the Text Barthes also refers to a 
“contradictory interplay” between the two poles of his opposition, but while doing 
this, he once again and unmistakably characterizes them as ‘(cultural) pleasure’ and 
‘(non-cultural) bliss’.20 
Theory of the text      
I will now turn to the notion of ‘text’ which from the 1970s comes to occupy an 
increasingly central position in the works of both Barthes and Lotman.21 This is 
important from our point of view, because their understandings of the text converge 
in many respects, helping to mitigate the differences evidenced in our analysis of their 
theories of secondary systems. 
In The Pleasure of the Text, Barthes thus advances the idea of the linguistic plurality 
of texts, describing it as the point of access to that ‘bliss’ which constituted, as we have 
seen, a repository of unpredictability and explosion: 
Thus the Biblical myth is reversed, the confusion of tongues is no longer a 
punishment, the subject gains access to bliss [jouissance] by the cohabitation of 
languages working side by side [qui travaillent côte à côte]: the text of pleasure is a 
sanctioned Babel (Barthes 1975[1973]: 3–4). 
Here, it is important to stress the horizontal (“cohabitation”), non-hierarchical 
(“working side by side”) understanding of the relations between different languages 
(systems), because it seems to be in direct opposition with the hierarchical 
articulation between first-order and second-order systems that characterized myth 
and connotation in the earlier Barthes. This line of thought is developed by Barthes 
in S/Z, where he opposes Ideology as a “singular system” which “reduces the plurality 
of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of languages” (Barthes 1990[1979]: 
5) to interpretation, which is a question of “asserting the very existence of plurality”: 
“to interpret a text is not to give it a (more or less justified, more or less free) meaning, 
but, on the contrary to appreciate what plural constitutes it” (Barthes 1990[1979]: 6, 
20 We could raise a similar argument for the case of Lotman and ideology. Th e notion of 
ideology is almost completely absent from his theory of secondary modelling systems and of 
culture in general. As can be observed in a couple of the quotes above, ‘ideological structures’ 
are briefl y mentioned by Lotman within an open list of other second-order structures and 
never considered separately. Lotman’s caution with ideology may be in part due to the abuse of 
the notion in the Soviet context.   
21 Barthes’ S/Z and Lotman’s Structure of the Artistic Text, both published in 1970, can be 
considered fundamental signposts of this conceptual shift  of attention.
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5). In S/Z Barthes “appreciates” this plurality through the choice of the famous five 
codes for his reading of Balzac’s Sarrazine. He calls one of these “cultural codes” (in the 
plural) and defines it as a “body of knowledge or wisdom” (Barthes 1990[1979]: 18). 
However, Barthes also promptly adds that “all codes are cultural”, coming here possibly 
the closest to Lotman’s idea of culture as a system of systems.
It seems therefore justified to speak of a shift in Barthes’s critique of ideology and 
his elaboration of instruments of semiological resistance to the “stealing of language” by 
second-order systems. For the earlier Barthes of Mythologies and Elements, ideological 
appropriation could be opposed through what he called the “degree zero” [degré zero] 
(Barthes 2010[1964]), exemplified by contemporary poetry as a “regressive semiological 
system” which brings language to a “pre-semiological state” (Barthes 1991[1957]: 132–33), 
where the second-order schema fails to steal it, lacking the necessary basis upon which to 
construct its significations.22 In The Pleasure of the Text and S/Z, semiological resistance 
to ideological subjection relies instead on the irreducible plurality of connotations that 
cannot possibly be mastered by a single and univocal second-order system. This brings 
Barthes closer to Lotman, for whom cultural polyglotism and its potential for generating 
new meanings is activated only in the text and thanks to the plurality of textual codes. 
As Lotman (1981: 7; my translation, D. M.) observes, 
The text does not appear to us as the realization of a message in a single language, 
but as a complex construction including various codes which is able to transform 
existing messages and generate new ones.23
In “From work to text”, an article written in 1971, Barthes interestingly employs the 
notion of ‘explosion’ – which he suggests should replace ‘interpretation’ – to describe 
the consequences of ‘irreducible plurality’ (1989: 59–61). There, he defines his notion 
of ‘intertextuality’ with a reference to the different ‘cultural languages’ which traverse 
the text in what he calls a vast ‘stereophony’ (60). Three years later Lotman would use 
the analogous notion of ‘stereoscopy’ in order to define the fundamental property of 
culture, which is its polyglotism (Lotman 1974). For Lotman, explosion clearly also 
stems out of plurality, from the co-existence of incommensurable languages within 
the same text: “It is precisely the translatability of the untranslatable, which produces 
22 “At bottom, it would only be the zero degree which could resist myth” (Barthes 1991[1957]: 
131). In this respect, Jonathan Culler (2002: 28) speaks of the “destruction of the sign” as 
Barthes’s most radical form of ideological demystifi cation. 
23 “текст предстает перед нами не как реализация сообщения на каком-либо одном языке, 
а как сложное устройство, хранящее многообразные коды, способное транс формировать 
получаемые сообщения и порождать новые.” Commenting on Lotman’s theory of the text, 
Julia Kristeva (1994: 376) thus observes, “Engendered by cultural dialogue […], the text generates 
the meaning of language – not the other way around, as one might readily think”. 
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a high degree of tension, that creates the conditions for an explosion in meaning” 
(Lotman 2013: 31). 24
Starting from the second half of the 1970s, this converging understanding of the 
text as the place of plurality and the emergence of new meanings is elaborated by 
Barthes and Lotman in different directions. For reasons that should be clear by now, 
in the semiotics of culture the notion of text increasingly comes to overlap with the 
notion of culture itself: “one might say that what turns a culture into a Text is internal 
polyglottism” (Lotman 1979: 507). Barthes develops the idea into his new understanding 
of “literature” as the place for a “permanent revolution of language” Barthes – “I can say 
without differentiation: literature, writing, or text,” (Barthes 1996[1978]: 367), he claims 
in the inaugural lecture at the Collège de France. In this 1977 lecture, the semiology of 
the 1950s retains its function as an “activator of social critique”, but has by now become a 
“literary semiotics” which does not coincide with linguistics but with the “deconstruction 
of linguistics”, insofar as language is now defined by Barthes as the (in)famously “fascist” 
place of power. This kind of semiology finds its natural ally in the text: “If the semiology 
I am speaking of then returned to the Text, it is because […] the Text itself appeared as 
the very index of nonpower” (Barthes 1996[1978] : 373).
Conclusion        
It is important to ask what contemporary semiotics has to learn from the convergences 
and divergences in the approaches of Barthes and Lotman to the study of secondary 
semiotic systems. An unavoidable starting point for a tentative answer to this question 
is represented by the important changes that have occurred since the 1970s in the 
status of semiotics as a discipline and, more generally, in the notions of ‘ideology’ and 
‘culture’ within both the academic and the public discourses. 
On the disciplinary front, semiotics has clearly lost its centrality and dynamic 
function for the humanities, so that today many scholars consider semiotics to be 
a relic of structuralism that is unable to enter a serious dialogue with new emerging 
research trends in cultural analysis. On the conceptual front, the notion of ‘ideology’ 
is being handled with an increasing suspicion, due to the tendency, widespread in the 
humanities and social sciences, to consider our times to be a “post-ideological era”, in 
which ideologies have stopped shaping our social behaviour. However, phenomena in 
contemporary mass culture seem rather to confirm the validity of Barthes’s analysis 
24  While Lotman and Barthes agree on the plurality of the text, they seem to disagree on 
its “infi nity”. Barthes (1989) explicitly makes a diff erence between the fi nitude and closure of 
the ‘work’ and the infi nity and openness of the text, while Lotman (1977: 209–217) considers 
framing, closure and fi nitude as essential features of the ‘text’. Th is is an important diff erence 
that surely needs to be investigated, but here I have decided to focus my attention rather on the 
issue of textual plurality.        
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of second-order semiological systems (myth, connotation) and their fundamentally 
ideological nature. Ideology, as described by Barthes, is alive and kicking in 
contemporary mass culture and the announcement of its death rather coincides with 
an ongoing withdrawal of the critique of ideology, leaving us with what French thinkers 
call la penseé unique, or ideological conformism to hegemonic discourses.25 
The notion of ‘culture’ enjoys, in contrast, an unprecedented popularity nowadays. 
It can be said to have become as self-evident and natural as Barthes’s myth, and it has 
progressively acquired a universal explicative power. Economic, social, political and 
religious relations and conflicts are thus increasingly handled by reducing them to cultural 
issues, which are often presented in public rhetoric in strongly mythologizing, simplifying 
and essentialist terms. ‘Culture’ as the inescapable determinant of all human understandings 
and behaviours thus tends to replace ideology, finally naturalizing its contents. 
Contemporary semiotics could regain its lost position within the humanities and 
social sciences precisely by challenging these mystifications of both ideology and culture. 
Semioticians are in a privileged position to do this, particularly thanks to Barthes’s, 
Lotman’s and the Tartu-Moscow School’s thorough work on secondary semiotic systems. 
While this gives us critical instruments for the demystification of ideological mechanisms 
and constructions in the case of Barthes, in the case of Lotman and the Tartu-Moscow 
School it elaborates analytical tools for a complex, plural and critical understanding of 
culture and its functioning. This is why, although Barthes’s and Lotman’s approaches 
to secondary semiotic systems contain important differences, opposing them as two 
absolute and reciprocally excluding research programmes is not the most productive 
theoretical attitude for contemporary semiotics. On the contrary, I am convinced that 
Barthes’s and Lotman’s ideas may, at least to a certain degree, complement each other in 
the elaboration of a renewed semiotic toolkit for cultural analysis that is up to meeting 
the challenges of its contemporary context and objects of study. The semiological critique 
of ideology and the semiotic analysis of culture are both necessary instruments for 
investigating the myths of our “post-ideological era of cultures” and the potentialities 
for cultural dynamics and change that those myths conceal and distort.
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Критика идеологии или анализ культуры? 
Барт и Лотман о вторичных семиотических системах
В статье сравниваются понятия Ролана Барта и Юрия Лотмана «семиологическая 
система второго порядка» (systemes sémiologique seconds) и «вторичные моделирующие 
системы». Рассматриваются общие предпосылки этих двух теорий и их важные 
расхождения. Расхождения объясняются с помощью противоположных стратегических 
ролей, которые понятия «идеология» и «культура» играют в работах Барта и Лотмана. 
Погружение вторичных моделирующих систем в культуру как «систему систем», 
характеризующейся внутренней разнородностью, позволяет Лотману отметить их 
положительный творческий потенциал: результат напряженных отношений как 
последствие системного многообразия и разнородности культуры может совпасть с 
появлением новых непредсказуемых значений при переводе. Контекстом для бартовских 
семиологических систем второго порядка являются крайне гомогенные идеологические 
обрамления, которые присваивают знаки систем первого порядка и превращают их в 
формы сигнификации. Эти формы подтверждают, воспроизводят и передают ранее 
существующую информацию, произведенную гегемонными дискурсами социума и 
культуры. В статье показано, как эти различия вновь проявляются и частично исчезают в 
теориях текста, которые Барт и Лотман усовершенствовали в 1970-х гг. Завершает статью 
обсуждение актуальности подходов Барта и Лотмана для современной семиотики и для 
гуманитарных наук в целом.
Ideoloogia kriitika või kultuurianalüüs? 
Barthes ja Lotman teisestest semiootilistest süsteemidest
Artiklis kõrvutatakse Roland Barthes’i ja Juri Lotmani mõisteid ‘teise tasandi semioloogilised 
süsteemid’ (systemes sémiologique seconds) ja ‘teisesed modelleerivad süsteemid’ (вторичные 
моделирующие системы). Vaadeldakse kahe teooria ühiseid eeldusi ning nendevahelisi olulisi 
erinevusi; viimaseid selgitatakse vastandlike strateegiliste rollide abil, mida mõisted ‘ideoloogia’ 
ja ‘kultuur’ mängivad vastavalt Barthes’i ja Lotmani teostes. Teiseste modelleerivate süsteemide 
ümbritsetus kultuurist kui “süsteemide süsteemist”, mida iseloomustab sisemine heterogeensus, 
võimaldab Lotmanil märgata nende positiivset loomingulist potentsiaali: kultuuri süsteemse 
paljususe ja heterogeensuse põhjustatud pingete tulemus võib ühte langeda uute, ennustamatute 
tähenduste esilekerkimisega tõlkimisel. Barthes’i teise tasandi semioloogliste süsteemide 
kontekstiks on selle asemel ülihomogeensed ideloogilised raamid, mis omastavad esmatasandi 
süsteemide märke ning muudavad need tähistusvormideks, mis kinnitavad, taastoodavad ja 
edastavad varem olemas olnud informatsiooni, mida loovad hegemoonsed ühiskondlikud ja 
kultuuridiskursused. Artiklis näidatakse, kuidas need erinevused tulevad taas esile ja osaliselt 
ka hajuvad tekstiteooriates, mida Barthes ja Lotman täiustasid 1970. aastatel. Arutelu lõpetavad 
mõned märkused Barthes’i ja Lotmani lähenemiste võimaliku aktuaalsuse kohta tänapäeva 
semiootikas ning humanitaarteadustes laiemalt. 
